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Review
Today, it has become almost impossible to read the news 
without noticing a reference to populism. Scholarly interest 
in this transnational phenomenon has been growing because 
an increasing number of politicians and parties are appar-
ently resorting to populist communication repertoires. 
Several studies analyzed the utilization of populist rhetoric 
(e.g., Wodak, 2015), populist messages (e.g., Rooduijn, 
2014), or populist communication styles (e.g., Jagers & 
Walgrave, 2007) and demonstrated that investigating popu-
list communication is crucial to fully understand the rise of 
political populism, as populism is mostly reflected in the 
oral, written, and visual communication of political actors 
(Aalberg & de Vreese, 2017). In a hybrid (Chadwick, 2017) 
or high choice media environment (van Aelst et al., 2017), 
politicians have gained new options for action because they 
have a greater number of communication channels—which 
differ in their affordances—at their disposal. Hence, it has 
become increasingly difficult to understand the role of a 
single medium in isolation (Bode & Vraga, 2017). These 
difficulties call for a comparative analysis that considers dif-
ferent media systems and different channel types. This type 
of analysis is especially important in the context of popu-
lism because there is conclusive empirical evidence that fea-
tures of specific media channels influence the amount of 
populist communication (Bos & Brants, 2014; Cranmer, 
2011; Ernst, Engesser, Büchel, Blassnig, & Esser, 2017). 
Our study compares the communicative self-presentation of 
political actors in three prototypical media channels for pop-
ulism, Facebook, Twitter, and political talk shows, across 
six Western democracies. In addition to the particularities of 
the channels, we investigate whether the characteristics of a 
political party influence the amount of populist communica-
tion. Although populism in Western democracies is often 
associated with right-wing political actors, several studies 
with a wider scope have revealed that parties at both edges 
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of the political spectrum adopt populist communication 
(Bernhard, 2016; Ernst et al., 2017; Rooduijn & Akkerman, 
2017). In addition to the left/right divide, we are also exam-
ining whether younger parties that adopt a challenger posi-
tion toward the establishment are more likely to use populist 
communication.
We define populist communication as the communica-
tive representation of the populist ideology (what is being 
said) and the use of populism-related stylistic elements 
(how something is being said) by all sorts of political actors. 
We, therefore, follow a communication-centered approach 
(Sorensen, 2017) by defining key characteristics—mes-
sages and styles—of populist communication. Following 
Kriesi’s (2018) suggestion, we will first translate the key 
concepts of populist ideology into empirically measurable 
“key messages.” Next, we will examine the “stylistic ele-
ments” that politicians use when going popular. Because 
Kriesi (2018, p. 13) argues that “populist content and popu-
list style tend to go together,” we will finally investigate 
similarities in politicians’ use of “key messages” and “sty-
listic elements.” 
An important contribution of our study is to identify and 
systematize stylistic elements that politicians use in a similar 
way as they utilize populist key messages. In particular, we 
will determine whether characteristics of the communication 
channel and properties of a political party influence in simi-
lar ways the use of populist key messages and certain style 
elements. For this purpose, we compare a broad spectrum of 
political actors on two social media platforms and 12 politi-
cal talk shows in six Western democracies (CH, DE, UK, US, 
IT, and FR). We find that (a) a variety of stylistic elements 
that previous literature has seen as part of populist actors’ 
communication strategy can be condensed to three dimen-
sions—similarly to three ideological dimensions of populist 
communication, (b) politicians are generally more inclined 
to use populist key messages and related style elements on 
Facebook and Twitter than in TV talk shows, and (c) politi-
cians from both new challenger parties and extreme parties 
use greater amounts of populism-related communication ele-
ments than established mainstream parties.
Populist Communication
Populism is a contested concept with a broad variety of dif-
ferent definitions (e.g., Canovan, 1999). Focusing on politi-
cal actors’ self-presentation and their communicative 
approaches, we can identify two main traditions in the lit-
erature, as populist communication has either been defined as 
an ideology (Mudde, 2004) or a communication style (Jagers 
& Walgrave, 2007). Engesser, Fazwi, & Larsson (2017) argue 
that these two traditions are not mutually exclusive and only 
represent different aspects of populism. Their conceptual-
ization of a populist communication logic distinguishes 
between four main approaches. First, populist ideology con-
ceives populism as a set of ideas and focuses on the 
content—the what—of populist communication. Second, 
populism as a style emphasizes populism as a mode of pre-
sentation and focuses on the form and how the content is 
presented. Third, populism as a political strategy conceives 
populism as a means to an end and is interested in the stra-
tegic motives and aims of populist communication. Fourth, 
research on populism can focus on actors by analyzing the 
messengers.
In terms of a starting point, we are building upon founda-
tions of the political science literature that conceptualizes 
populism as a relational concept with a distinct set of politi-
cal ideas (Hawkins, 2009; Kaltwasser & Taggart, 2016; 
Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017). We, therefore, conceive and 
define populism as a thin ideology. Populism claims that the 
people have been betrayed by the elites in charge who are 
abusing their positions of power, and it demands that the sov-
ereignty of the people must be restored. Furthermore, we fol-
low Hawkins (2009) who emphasizes that these basic ideas 
are expressed with specific discourse patterns, and we follow 
Wodak (2015, p. 3) who argues that populist political com-
munication always “combines and integrates form and con-
tent” by providing “a dynamic mix of substance and style.” 
Some scholars—most notably Moffitt (2016)—have built 
ideological elements into stylistic definitions of populism. 
However, this is a proposal that we expressly do not want to 
follow, because we want to keep the basic ideological com-
ponents of populist ideas separate from stylistic elements.
A populist vision of democracy basically separates soci-
ety into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, “the 
good people” versus “the bad elite,” and postulates the unre-
stricted sovereignty of the people (Abts & Rummens, 2007; 
Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Mudde, 2004; Wirth et al., 
2016).1 Following this conceptualization, Mény and Surel 
(2002) have identified three key notions of populism: glorifi-
cation of the people (people-centrism), condemnation of cor-
rupt elites (anti-elitism), and claims for the restoration of 
popular sovereignty (popular sovereignty). When communi-
cated in public, these ideological dimensions are broken 
down by political actors into nine key messages (Table 1). 
Previous studies have translated these key messages into 
empirically measurable categories of quantitative content 
analysis (see Ernst et al., 2017).
According to Kriesi (2018), the use of these key messages 
is part of a political strategy that manifests itself in broader 
communication patterns. In his view, a populist political 
communication strategy is also expressed by the use of a spe-
cific communication style. Kriesi (2018, p. 12) expects this 
style to be characterized by elements such as “emergency 
rhetoric,” “emotionalization” as well as “assertive/absolut-
ist” and “colloquial” language, among others. His position is 
fully compatible with Sorensen’s (2017) stand that 
“approaching populism from a communications perspective 
(. . . ) inevitably involves considerations of style as well as 
ideology” (p. 139). We follow Hofstadter’s (2008) definition 
of a communication style being the way ideas are believed 
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and advocated by a political actor rather than the truth or 
falsity of the content (Block & Negrine, 2017).
We are interested in finding systematic parallels in the use 
of populist key messages and the use of certain stylistic ele-
ments. We have searched the research literature to identify 
the communicative stylistic elements attributed to populist 
actors. We have finally identified seven of them, which we 
have summarized in Table 2. It is important to make clear 
that until we have examined these stylistic elements in more 
detail, we do not yet claim that they are populist in them-
selves. Following Kriesi (2018), we only say that they can be 
considered expressions of the same communication strategy 
that can also lead to the use of populist key messages.
The first style element with an affinity to populism is nega-
tivism. It refers to the tendency of populist actors to paint soci-
ety darkly by attributing negative characteristics to the elites 
or dangerous others or by condemning situations or actions 
with a negative outcome (Alvares & Dahlgren, 2016; Block & 
Negrine, 2017; Bracciale & Martella, 2017; Engesser, Fawzi 
et al., 2017). Second, populist actors gravitate toward portray-
ing various situations or developments as crises. To employ 
this crisis rhetoric, populist actors usually adopt rhetorical ele-
ments of immorality, exaggeration, scandal, emergency, or 
war. Third, the emotional tone style comprises populist actors’ 
tendency to share positive or negative emotions or reveal feel-
ings (Block & Negrine, 2017; Bos, van der Brug, & de Vreese, 
2013; Bracciale & Martella, 2017; Canovan, 1999; Engesser, 
Fawzi et al., 2017; Hameleers, Bos, & de Vreese, 2017). While 
most authors stress the importance of negative emotions that 
are raised against others or elites, positive emotions can be 
directed to the people or the populist leader. Fourth, absolut-
ism describes the affinity of populist actors to paint the society 
in black and white terms without any shades of gray. The style 
expresses itself in the use of an assertive tone and a hesitation 
to use relativizing words in their communication (Bos & 
Brants, 2014; Engesser, Fawzi et al., 2017; Hawkins, 2009). 
Fifth, patriotism as a populist communication style portrays 
the tendency of populists to long for a time when everything 
Table 1. Conceptualization and Operationalization of Populist Key Messages.
Dimension Populist key message Underlying ideology Categories
Anti-Elitism Discrediting the elite Elites are corrupt. Elites are accused of being malevolent, criminal, lazy, stupid, 
extremist, racist, undemocratic, and so on. The elite are called names 
and denied morality, charisma, credibility, intelligence, competence, 
consistency, and so on.
Blaming the elite Elites are harmful. Elites are described as a threat/burden, responsible for negative 
developments/situations, or as having committed mistakes or 
crimes. Elites are described as not being a source of enrichment or 
responsible for positive developments/situations.
Detaching the elite 
from the people
Elites do not represent 
the people.
Elites are described as not belonging to the people, not being close 
to the people, not knowing the people, not speaking for the people, 
not caring for the people, or not performing everyday actions.
People 
centrism
Stressing the people’s 
virtues
The people are virtuous. The people are bestowed with morality, charisma, credibility, 
intelligence, competence, consistency, and so on. The people are 
exempt from being malevolent, criminal, lazy, stupid, extremist, 
racist, undemocratic, and so on.
Praising the people’s 
achievements
The people are beneficial. The people are described as being enriched or responsible for 
a positive development/situation. The people are described as 
not being a threat/burden, not being responsible for negative 
developments/situations, nor as having committed mistakes or 
crimes.
Stating a monolithic 
people
The people are 
homogeneous.
People are described as sharing common feelings, desires, or 
opinions.
Demonstrating 
closeness to the 
people
The populist represents 
the people.
The speaker describes himself as belonging to the people, being close 
to the people, knowing the people, speaking for the people, caring 
for the people, agreeing with the people, or performing everyday 
actions. The speaker claims to represent or embody the people.
Restoring 
sovereignty
Demanding popular 
sovereignty
The people are the 
ultimate sovereign.
The speaker argues for general institutional reforms to grant the 
people more power by introducing direct-democratic elements 
or increasing political participation. The speaker argues in favor of 
granting more power to the people within the context of a specific 
issue (e.g., election, immigration, security).
Denying elite 
sovereignty
The elites deprive 
the people of their 
sovereignty.
The speaker argues in favor of granting less power to elites within 
the context of a specific issue (e.g., election, immigration, security).
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was much better and emphasize the superiority of their own 
country by employing rhetorical elements referencing an ide-
alized and sometimes utopic vision of the country or heartland 
(Block & Negrine, 2017; Rydgren, 2017; Taggart, 2000). 
Sixth, populist actors are prone to reduce complexity by 
employing a colloquial style, which manifests itself in simple, 
dialect, colloquial, or vulgar language to reach ordinary citi-
zens (Albertazzi & McDonnell, 2008; Bracciale & Martella, 
2017; Engesser, Fawzi et al., 2017; Moffitt, 2016). Finally, 
populist actors do not shy away from using an intimization 
style in which they recount personal and intimate details about 
their personal lives to portray themselves as approachable and 
down-to-earth politicians (Bracciale & Martella, 2017; 
Stanyer, 2012).
Overall, we take a communication-centered approach and 
conceive of populist communication as an outcome of a 
strategy that uses both ideological key messages and certain 
stylistic elements (see also Bracciale & Martella, 2017; 
Krämer, 2014; Stockemer & Barisione, 2017; Wirth et al., 
2016). How these two components manifest themselves is an 
open empirical question that we want to clarify. But Krämer 
(2017) has already pointed out that there is often a “homol-
ogy between ideologies and styles” (p. 1305) and that schol-
ars should not refrain from style-based reconstructions of 
populism—however “thin” they may be. Especially because 
content and form tend to interfere and interact with one 
another (Stockemer & Barisione, 2017). By combining both 
perspectives, we wish to explore similarities in the use of 
populist key messages and stylistic devices on social media 
and political talk shows.
Populist Communication on Social 
Media and Political Talk Shows
In a hybrid media system where new and old media are inter-
twined and their logics complement each other, political actors 
no longer rely on a single communication channel (Chadwick, 
2017). Instead, they choose a variety of different channels to 
achieve their communicative goals. Bode and Vraga (2017) 
argue that studying single media platforms in isolation ignores 
the reality of the contemporary media system. This argument 
is especially important because research has demonstrated that 
the specific characteristics of the communication channel 
influence the amount of populist communication (Bos & 
Brants, 2014; Cranmer, 2011; Ernst et al., 2017). By investi-
gating populist communication on television and social media, 
we can gain a more detailed understanding of how the features 
of a platform affect populist communication. Political talk 
shows and social media represent two different types of com-
munication channels that suggest differences in the way politi-
cians from different parties and countries use them for populist 
purposes. What unites these channels is that they offer 
Table 2. Conceptualization and Operationalization of Populism-Related Style Elements.
Dimension Stylistic devices Underlying style element Categories
Negativity Negativism Paint society and its members (part of the 
people) “in black” by attributing negative 
characteristics or condemning actions/situations 
with negative outcome.
Targets are accused of being malevolent, criminal, 
lazy, stupid, racist, and so on or are denied being 
benevolent, likable, intelligent, credible, loyal, 
consistent, and so on.
Crisis rhetoric Portraying a situation/development as a crisis 
using exaggerations, emergency rhetoric or 
declaring a scandal.
Speaker uses rhetorical elements of immorality, 
exaggeration, scandal, emergency, or war  
rhetoric.
Emotionality Emotional tone Sharing positive and negative emotions or 
revealing feelings.
Speaker uses emotional language by expressing 
discrete positive (e.g., happiness, contentment, 
hope, pride, trust) or negative (e.g., anger, 
uneasiness, sadness, fear, regret, affection) 
emotions.
Absolutism Using an assertive tone and lacking relativizing 
words. Tendency to paint world in black and 
white without any shades of gray.
Speaker uses rhetorical figure of absolutism  
by presenting something as the only  
conceivable option or as preposterous or 
unbearable.
Patriotism Emphasizing of the superiority of own country 
by referencing an idealized and utopic heartland.
Speaker uses rhetorical figure of patriotism by 
emphasizing superiority of own country or some 
obscure heartland.
Sociability Colloquialism Preference for a simple, dialect, colloquial, or 
vulgar language and use of nicknames to reach 
the ordinary people.
Speaker uses vulgar language or slang, employs 
sarcasm or rhetorical questions and address 
targets with nicknames.
Intimization Recounting personal and intimate details about 
personal life.
Targets are described in their predominately 
personal life by emphasizing their family or love life 
and making references to personal way of life or 
leisure activities.
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politicians favorable opportunities for self-presentation with 
little to no interference from skeptical, hard-nosed political 
journalists (Esser, Stępińska, & Hopmann, 2017). They are 
moreover prototypical channels for populist communication 
and both Bos and Brants (2014) and Cranmer (2011) conclude, 
that especially political talk shows offer great opportunity 
structures for populist communication.
Social media plays a major role in the political communi-
cation strategies of contemporary parties (Stieglitz, Dang-
Xuan, 2013). Especially, Twitter and Facebook have emerged 
as central media platforms that rival traditional news media 
in reach and influence (Fisher, Marshall, & McCallum, 
2018). The possibility to bypass news journalists and the 
ability of political actors to communicate directly with their 
publics increases the chances of successful self-promotion 
(Lilleker & Koc-Michalska, 2013). This gives us already an 
idea of why social media networks have transpired as a par-
ticularly well-suited channel for populist communication 
(Ernst et al., 2017).
Four opportunity structures of Facebook and Twitter 
foster the potential for populist communication: They offer 
the possibility to establish a close connection to the people, 
they provide a direct access to the public without journalis-
tic interventions, they can create a feeling of community 
and recognition among otherwise scattered groups, and 
they foster the potential for personalization (Ernst et al., 
2017).
When comparing the two social media platforms in rela-
tion to their potential for populist purposes, Facebook has 
four advantages over Twitter. First, Facebook offers more 
reciprocal message exchanges; second, it has higher levels of 
proximity and the connection between Facebook users is 
generally more intensive, personal, and intimate; and third, 
Facebook is not subject to certain character limits, which 
gives political actors greater opportunity to make their case 
effectively and elaborately. Finally, due to the different char-
acteristics of users (in terms of education, socioeconomic 
status, or political interest), Twitter has a stronger profes-
sional orientation, and political actors may consider it less 
suitable for spreading populism (Jacobs & Spierings, 2018). 
In contrast, Facebook is the platform for ordinary citizens to 
interact with politicians (Kalsnes, Larsson, & Enli, 2017), 
which makes it more suitable for populist communication. 
Schulz (2018) has supported this argument from the audi-
ence perspective by showing that populist citizens are more 
likely to use Facebook as their source of political informa-
tion, while nonpopulist citizens rather use Twitter for infor-
mation purposes.
Television talk shows belong to a completely different 
media category, but can fulfill similar functions for politi-
cians. They are important outlets for the articulation of politi-
cal ideas (Baym, 2013; Jones, 2010; Kessler & Lachenmaier, 
2017) and have a positive effect on viewers’ trust in politi-
cians (Boukes & Boomgaarden, 2016). Like social media, 
talk shows offer the opportunity to bypass the watchdog 
journalism more commonly found in hard news programs, 
offer the possibility of self-presentation, and foster the poten-
tial for personalization (Boukes & Boomgaarden, 2016; 
Kessler & Lachenmaier, 2017). Political talk shows, there-
fore, represent another ideal stage for populist communica-
tion (Cranmer, 2011) and make the comparison with 
Facebook and Twitter more meaningful.
Research Questions and Hypotheses
The aim of this study is twofold. In the first step, we will 
examine the seven populism-related style elements for their 
broader underlying dimensions. To examine the relationship 
between these seven stylistic elements, we examine the fol-
lowing research question:
RQ1: Do populism-related style elements form distinct 
dimensions?
In a second step, we will investigate whether the charac-
teristics of communication channels and the properties of 
parties affect the degree of populist communication on social 
media and political talk shows. Recent research has demon-
strated the importance of Facebook and Twitter for populist 
communication (e.g., Bracciale & Martella, 2017; Engesser, 
Ernst, Esser, & Büchel, 2017; Hameleers & Schmuck, 2017; 
Stier, Posch, Bleier, & Strohmaier, 2017). However, these 
studies lack a comparison of different media channels. In 
previous research, political talk shows were found to contain 
the highest level of populist communication compared with 
other arenas (Bos & Brants, 2014; Cranmer, 2011). Yet, none 
of these studies compared the amount of populist communi-
cation to social media. We argue that Facebook and Twitter 
are even more advantageous for spreading populist commu-
nication than talk shows because they allow politicians to 
circumvent traditional gatekeepers completely; they further 
allow for better message targeting and personalization and 
for the establishment of reciprocal relationships and a more 
direct line to their followers (Ernst et al., 2017). Hence, the 
first hypothesis to be tested is
H1: The proportion of populist key messages and related 
style elements are higher on Facebook and Twitter than on 
political talk shows.
In addition, the properties of political parties are of spe-
cial interest to this study. The so-called challenger parties are 
a particularly relevant party category because they are often 
perceived as a threat to the party establishment (Meguid, 
2005) and assumed to use populist communication to gener-
ate attention (Kriesi, 2014). Throughout the various crisis 
cycles since the 1980s, new challenger parties from both the 
left and the right have emerged and gained success in many 
Western democracies (Hobolt & Tilley, 2016; Müller-
Rommel, 1998). Kriesi (2014) argues that these 
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new challenger parties may be perceived as a threat to the 
establishment because they highlight problems that have 
been neglected by mainstream parties, mobilize outside of 
the electoral channels, and resort to creative, innovative 
forms of protest communication. New right- and left-wing 
challenger parties can thus be expected to blame the elites 
and complain about a neglect of the people’s true concerns 
(Kriesi, 2014). Hence, these parties may rely on populist 
communication to improve their electoral chances (Betz, 
2002) and their media visibility (Mazzoleni, 2008). These 
assumptions are supported by a longitudinal study from 
Switzerland that found that new parties—independent from 
their ideological stance—relied on high levels of populist 
communication in party advertising and press releases dur-
ing their initial “challenger phase” (Weber, 2017). We would 
like to examine this mechanism on a broader empirical basis 
and propose the following hypothesis:
H2: Challenger parties use a greater proportion of popu-
list key messages and related style elements than estab-
lished parties.
Party extremism is also expected to influence the amount 
of populist communication. Populism is often too quickly 
associated with right-wing parties. However, populism 
should be considered as a latent or thin ideology (Hawkins, 
2009; Stanley, 2008) that, due to its “thinness,” can be com-
bined with a variety of “thick” host ideologies (such as 
socialism, authoritarianism, nationalism) that add more spe-
cific content to it. Although right- and left-leaning parties 
differ in their ideologies, party programs, and social basis, 
they have several characteristics in common that are related 
to populist communication. At least in Western Europe, they 
emerged in recent decades, often compensate for their small-
sized party organization with large-sized communication 
offensives, tend to remain opposition parties, and share a 
protest attitude against established parties, politics, and state 
structures (Müller-Rommel, 1998). Moreover, research has 
substantiated that parties at the fringes of the political spec-
trum are more inclined than moderate parties to challenge the 
current government, attack elites, and glorify the people in 
their communication within party manifestos (Rooduijn & 
Akkerman, 2017), press releases (Bernhard, 2016), and on 
social media (Ernst et al., 2017). Against this background, 
we propose the following hypothesis:
H3: Extreme parties use a greater proportion of populist 
key messages and related style elements than moderate 
parties.
Method
We content-analyzed populist key messages and related style 
elements used by 110 politicians on political talk shows and 
social media across six countries in 2015 using a semiauto-
matic coding program. These channels were chosen because 
they mostly lack journalistic interference and allow a rela-
tively unfiltered view of politicians’ communication.
Sample
To test our hypotheses, we need to construct a sample of 
politicians from different political parties who appear on talk 
shows and social media using populist messages and stylistic 
devices during our investigation period. To explore populist 
communication as a transnational phenomenon (Aalberg, 
Esser, Reinemann, Strömbäck, & de Vreese, 2017; Moffitt, 
2016), these politicians need to come from different coun-
tries. This requires a three-step procedure: we first identified 
relevant countries, then sampled the relevant political talk 
shows and listed all appearing politicians, and finally col-
lected the social media material of these politicians. By 
applying such an individual matching procedure on the 
microlevel of politicians, the study ensures the comparability 
of communication on both channel types and thus avoids 
ecological fallacies.
In the first step, we selected six countries (CH, DE, IT, 
FR, UK, and US). By performing all analyses under six dif-
ferent macrosocial conditions, our multinational compara-
tive design serves as a robustness check for the meaningfulness 
of our findings. In other words, our conclusions on which 
media types and party types are more susceptible to populist 
communication thus gain more reach and validity. The coun-
try sample provides sufficient variability regarding political 
systems (parliamentary vs. presidential, representative vs. 
directional, consensus vs. majoritarian systems), party char-
acteristics (strong vs. weak populist parties), and consumer 
preferences for political information sources (Aalberg et al., 
2017; Newman, Fletcher, Kalogeropoulos, Levy, & Kleis 
Nielsen, 2017).
In the second step, we identified two influential political 
talk shows per country (see Table A in online appendix) and 
recorded four episodes of each show during a 2-month period 
of routine news without national elections from April through 
May 2015. The twelve selected talk shows all air weekly and 
achieve high market shares in their segment. They are all pri-
marily political in focus, follow a roundtable format, have a 
length of approximately 60 min,2 and regularly invite politi-
cians as guests. The number of politicians ranged from one to 
five per show; we coded only their statements and disre-
garded those made by the moderator, nonpolitical guests, or 
members of the audience. This led to a total of 1579 state-
ments by 110 political actors across the 48 taped programs.
In the third step, we collected the social media material 
(Facebook posts and Tweets) of all politicians3 who appeared 
on the talk shows during the study period.4 We considered 
only Tweets and Facebook posts that included direct state-
ments of the politician and were longer than eight characters. 
Simple Retweets and Tweets or Facebook posts including 
only pictures, links, or videos were excluded from the analy-
sis. We drew a random sample of 50 social media statements 
per politician (N = 5099).
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Out of the initial sample, we kept only those statements 
that included a veritable statement by a politician and 
expressed either a political position, an elaboration on a 
political issue, or an evaluation, or an attribution of a target 
actor (N = 2130). We further excluded politicians with less 
than five statements in total or no clear party affiliation. This 
led to a final sample of N = 969 talk show statements, N = 734 
Facebook posts, and N = 364 Tweets by 98 politicians from 
31 political parties.
Unit of Analysis
The unit of analysis is a single statement made by a politician. 
It can contain a key message and/or a stylistic device. In the 
terminology of our codebook, statements are made by speak-
ers (i.e., politicians) about a target actor or an issue. A target 
actor is the object of a politician’s characterization or evalua-
tion and may include politicians, members of the elite, or the 
people. A political issue refers to the thematic context of the 
statement.
A team of intensively trained student coders reached 
acceptable levels of reliability. The average Brennan and 
Prediger’s kappa across all messages and styles is .91 (see 
Table B in online appendix).
Operationalization
Populism-Related Communication. The nine populist key mes-
sages and the seven stylistic devices were gathered based on the 
instructions given in a codebook (for details on the categories 
used see Tables 1 and 2). For each category, we recorded 
whether the variable was present in a statement. A key message 
or stylistic device was considered present if at least one of the 
related categories was coded. The dependent variable, popu-
lism-related communication, was present if at least one of the 
nine populist key messages or seven stylistic elements were 
observed.
Party Categories. The 98 politicians belong to 31 political 
parties. Table 3 depicts the number of politicians per party 
(for further details see Table C in online appendix). To 
determine the degree of party extremism, we assigned each 
party its respective Chapel Hill expert survey (CHES) 
score (Table 3). We had to rate American and some Italian 
parties ourselves because the CHES did not include them 
(Polk et al., 2017). For each party score, we subtracted the 
theoretical center of the scale (–5) and took the absolute 
value to obtain a measure of party extremism. We also 
recorded the age of each party. Since most challenger par-
ties emerged in recent decades (Hobolt & Tilley, 2016; 
Müller-Rommel, 1998; Weber, 2017), we coded all parties 
founded after 1980 as challenger parties. Furthermore, two 
dummies for Facebook and Twitter (vs. political talk 
shows) were calculated.
Findings
Sample Description
In total, 38% of all statements contain at least one populism-
related communication element. Overall, populist key mes-
sages and stylistic devices are weakly correlated (r = .173, 
p < .01), and the style elements (31.3%) are used significantly 
more, t(2066) = 17.35, p < .001, than populist key messages 
(13.6%). Anti-elitist key messages (9.6%) are more promi-
nent than people-centrist key messages (3.3%). Key mes-
sages about restoring sovereignty are almost absent (0.9%) 
in politicians’ communication on social media and talk 
shows. Negativity (19.9%) and emotionality (12.2%) are 
commonly used style elements, whereas sociability (4.8%) is 
only present in every 20th statement.
Research Question and Hypotheses
In a first step, we conducted a principal component factor 
analysis with the seven style elements (varimax rotation, 
Kaiser normalization). The factor analysis identified three 
distinct dimensions (51.4% explained variance, Bartlett’s 
test of sphericity = χ2(21) = 282.3, p < .001) without any sub-
stantial cross-loadings (Table 4). Negativity comprises nega-
tivism and crisis rhetoric; emotionality includes emotional 
tone, absolutism, and patriotism; and sociability is composed 
of colloquialism and intimization. We consider this finding 
an important empirical contribution to the literature that dis-
cusses stylistic devices as part of populist actors’ communi-
cation strategy. It provides the basis for our further 
analyses.
To test our three hypotheses, we conducted 12 multilevel 
models (Table 5 for an overview) with maximum-likelihood 
estimation (ML). In Models 1 to 4, populism-related com-
munication is the dependent variable, which means the use 
of at least one populist key message and/or at least one style 
element. Due to the rather weak correlation of populist key 
messages and stylistic elements, we calculated eight addi-
tional models to test the effects for both components sepa-
rately. In Models 5 to 8, the dependent variable is the use of 
any populist key message and in Models 9 to 12, the depen-
dent variable is the use of any style element. Units of analy-
sis are statements made by politicians on Twitter, Facebook, 
or political talk shows. These statements by politicians are 
nested in political party properties. Hence, the independent 
variables for Hypothesis 1 (social media) are located at the 
first level, while the independent variables for Hypothesis 2 
and Hypothesis 3 (challenger parties and extremism) are 
located at the second level. Before assessing the multilevel 
models, we determined whether it is useful to let the inter-
cepts vary across parties. If we compare the respective base-
line models with Model 1 (χ2(1) = 46.26, p < .001), Model 5 
(χ2(1) = 42.06, p < .001), and Model 9 (χ2(1) = 38.23, p < .001) 
we can conclude that in all three models, the intercepts vary 
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Table 3. Overview of Political Party Sample.
Country Party information Political stance
Left Moderate Left Center Moderate Right Right
CH Political party GPS SP CVP FDP SVP
CHES score 1.88 2.13 5.5 6.88 8.25
Founding year 1983 1888 1912 2009 1971
Number of represented politicians 3 4 3 3 7
Populism-related communication score 0.28 0.30 0.24 0.26 0.42
Political party GLP  
CHES score 5.25  
Founding year 2007  
Number of represented politicians 1  
Populism-related communication score 0.32  
DE Political party Linke SPD CDU FDP AfD
CHES score 1.23 3.77 5.92 6.54 8.92
Founding year 2007 1963 1945 1948 2013
Number of represented politicians 2 3 4 1 1
Populism-related communication score 0.50 0.40 0.10 0.10 0.42
Political party Gruenen CSU  
CHES score 3.62 7.23  
Founding year 1993 1945  
Number of represented politicians 3 1  
Populism-related communication score 0.47 0.13  
FR Political party PS  
CHES score 3.83  
Founding year 1969  
Number of represented politicians 3  
Populism-related communication score 0.25  
IT Political party PD SC FI LN
CHES score 3.57 5.43 6.71 8.86
Founding year 2007 2013 1994 1998
Number of represented politicians 11 1 1 2
Populism-related communication score 0.37 0.44 0.33 0.63
Political party RI M5S Fdl  
CHES score 3 4.67 7.86  
Founding year 2001 2009 2012  
Number of represented politicians 1 1 1  
Populism-related communication score 0.50 0.44 0.38  
Political party IdV  
CHES score 5  
Founding year 1998  
Number of represented politicians 1  
Populism-related communication score 0.40  
UK Political party Green Lab LibDem Cons UKIP
CHES score 1.86 3.57 4.86 7 9.14
Founding year 1990 1900 1988 1934 1993
Number of represented politicians 1 4 4 5 3
Populism-related communication score 0.50 0.38 0.40 0.45 0.55
Political party SNP  
CHES score 3  
Founding year 1934  
Number of represented politicians 3  
Populism-related communication score 0.28  
Political party Plaid  
CHES score 3.25  
Founding year 1925  
Number of represented politicians 1  
Populism-related communication score 0.79  
(Continued)
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Table 4. Factor Analysis of Populism-Related Style 
Elements.
Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3
 Negativity Emotionality Sociability
Negativism 0.78 −0.08 0.16
Crisis rhetoric 0.73 0.20 −0.07
Emotional tone −0.10 0.66 0.09
Absolutism 0.05 0.63 −0.02
Patriotism 0.17 0.57 −0.05
Colloquialism −0.11 −0.02 0.79
Intimization 0.19 0.05 0.70
Self-value 1.23 1.21 1.16
Variance explained (%) 17.50 17.33 16.60
Total variance (%) 51.42
Note. Rotated factormatrix (principal component factor analysis, varimax 
rotation), KMO = .56, Bartlett’s test of sphericity χ2(21) = 282.3, p < .001, N = 2065.
Country Party information Political stance
Left Moderate Left Center Moderate Right Right
US Political party D R  
CHES score 3 7  
Founding year 1828 1854  
Number of represented politicians 9 8  
Populism-related communication score 0.27 0.36  
Note. Gray background stands for challenger parties. For RI, IdV, D, and R no CHES score exist. We placed these parties ourselves and assigned them an 
individual extremism score. The populist-related communication score (range = 0-1) is based on both messages and styles across social media and political 
talk shows.
Table 3. (Continued)
significantly across parties and significantly improved the 
model fits.
Hypothesis 1 predicted that populism-related communica-
tion by various political actors is higher on social media than 
political talk shows. To test this hypothesis, we added two 
fixed effects of Twitter (dummy) and Facebook (dummy) to 
the model. A model comparison demonstrated that the fit of 
the models significantly increased for Model 2 (χ2(1) = 49.60, 
p < .001), Model 6 (χ2(1) = 12.14, p < .01), and Model 10 
(χ2(1) = 50.43, p < .001). We find clear support for this hypoth-
esis. Model 2 shows that statements on Facebook (β = .17, 
t(2035) = 7.09, p < .001) and Twitter (β = .08, t(2035) = 3.17, 
p < .001) significantly predict populism-related communica-
tion and demonstrates that the degree of populism-related 
communication is higher on both social media platforms than 
political talk shows. This pattern is identical for style elements 
(Twitter: β = .08, t(2035) = 3.29, p < .001; Facebook: β = .17, 
t(2035) = 7.16, p < .001 Model 10) in isolation as well. For 
populist key messages, we only find a significant effect for 
Facebook (β = .08, t(2035) = 3.45, p < .001). Key messages on 
Twitter, however, are not more common than in political talk 
shows (β = .02, t(2035) = 0.66, ns). If we compare the two 
social media platforms, we can conclude that Facebook is the 
stronger predictor and that political actors tend to prefer 
Facebook for their populism-related communication.
Hypothesis 2 argued that challenger parties use more pop-
ulism-related communication than established mainstream 
parties. To test this hypothesis, we added the challenger party 
dummy as another fixed effect to the models. Again, model 
comparisons revealed that the fit of all models significantly 
improved for Model 3 (χ2(1) = 7.45, p < .01), Model 7 
(χ2(1) = 4.95, p < .05), and Model 11 (χ2(1) = 10.35, p < .001). 
In Model 3, we find support for this hypothesis and show that 
challenger parties use more populism-related communica-
tion (β = .11, t(29) = 2.95, p < .01) than established parties. We 
identified the same pattern for populist key messages in 
Model 7 (β = .09, t(29) = 2.27, p < .05) and style elements in 
Model 11 (β = .12, t(29) = 3.70, p < .001).
To test whether party extremism positively influences the 
amount of populism-related communication, which is postu-
lated in Hypothesis 3, we added extremism as a fourth addi-
tional fixed effect. Model comparisons reveal that for model 4 
with the combined use of populist key messages and stylistic 
elements as the dependent variable, the fit increased signifi-
cantly (χ2(1) = 5.08, p < .05), meaning that parties with high 
extremism scores use populism-related communication more 
often (β = 0.08, t(28) = 2.42, p < .05; model 4) than moderate 
parties with low extremism scores. For the separate use of pop-
ulist key messages (χ2(1) = 2.85, p = .09; model 8) or stylistic 
devices (χ2(1) = 2.64.14, p = .06; model 12), we only find 
somewhat weaker effects. The influence of party extremism on 
the separate use of either populist key messages (β = 0.06, 
t(28) = 1.81, p = .08; model 8) or stylistic devices (β = 0.06, 
t(28) = 1.97, p = .06; model 12) leans toward significance, but 
narrowly missed the standard p-value threshold. In sum, we 
only find partial support for hypothesis 3. Party extremism 
results in a significantly higher use of the combination of pop-
ulism-related communication; for messages and style elements 
separately however, we can only report a trend.
All 12 multilevel models present clear support for the 
three postulated hypotheses, demonstrating that parties are 
generally more inclined to use populism-related communica-
tion on Facebook and Twitter than in talk shows and that new 
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challenger parties as well as extreme parties use higher 
amounts of populism-related communication.5
Discussion and Conclusion
In a communications approach, populist ideology and style 
elements are considered inextricably intertwined, but 
scholars need to keep them analytically distinct and analyze 
them with separate empirical measures. We are aware that 
some researchers such as Moffitt (2016) have incorporated 
ideological elements into the stylistic definition of popu-
lism, but we deliberately do not follow this approach. We 
understand populist communication as the outcome of a 
political strategy that uses both ideological key messages 
and certain stylistic elements. We have developed system-
atic operationalizations for messages (content) and styles 
(form) and examined them with a content analysis that takes 
into account different countries, communication channels 
and party types.
We argued that populism as an ideology consists of three 
programmatic components that are communicated publicly 
through nine key messages. In a similar way, we have exam-
ined stylistic elements of a “going popular” strategy and 
found that they can also be grouped into three dimensions: 
negativity, emotionality, and sociability. This deserves atten-
tion because the research of style elements is still in develop-
ment while the research of ideological key messages is 
already better established. We have placed particular empha-
sis on stylistic elements because politicians have to convey 
their messages through media channels and package them 
effectively. If the stylistic elements we examined were used 
equally by all political parties (including mainstream parties), 
one could not assume a close relationship to populism. But 
our results indicate a different pattern. We find that politicians 
who use ideological key messages most frequently (namely, 
those of challenger parties and extreme parties) also use these 
stylistic elements most often. This is what we had anticipated, 
because we have primarily examined those stylistic elements 
the previous literature had attributed to populist politicians. 
This important finding leads us to conclude that we are deal-
ing here with populism-related or even populist stylistic 
elements.
We further theorized that Facebook and Twitter are more 
susceptible to the use of populism-related communication 
than talk shows because social media makes it easier for 
politicians to bypass the traditional media, to tailor their 
messages to their target groups, and to present themselves as 
close to the people. With regard to political parties, we argue 
Table 5. Multilevel Model of Populism-Related Communication.
Populism-related communication Populist key messages Populism-related style elements
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12
 β β β β β β β β β β β β
 SE SE SE SE SE SE SE SE SE SE SE SE
(Intercept) −0.013 −0.003 0.018 −0.007 −0.008 −0.005 −0.015 −0.008 −0.003 0.006 −0.007 −0.003
 0.050 0.044 0.042 0.033 0.044 0.042 0.040 0.037 0.050 0.043 0.033 0.030
Twitter 0.076 0.078 0.077 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.079 0.082 0.079
 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024
 *** *** ** *** *** ***
Facebook 0.169 0.171 0.172 0.083 0.084 0.024 0.171 0.175 0.174
 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.024 0.022 0.024 0.024 0.023
 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** ***
Challenger 
party
0.113 0.102 0.089 0.081 0.121 0.115
 0.038 0.033 0.039 0.036 0.033 0.030
 ** ** * * *** ***
Extremism 0.078 0.064 0.058
 0.032 0.035 0.030
 * † †
AIC 5824.63 5779.04 5775.39 5770.52 5828.83 5820.68 5817.73 5816.88 5832.66 5786.24 5819.73 5776.24
BIC 5841.53 5807.21 5814.83 5809.95 5845.73 5848.85 5851.54 5856.32 5849.56 5814.41 5859.17 5815.68
Log likelihood −2909.32 −2884.52 −2880.70 −2878.26 −2911.42 −2905.34 −2902.87 −2901.44 −2913.33 −2888.12 −2902.87 −2881.12
Level 1 N 
(statements)
2067 2067 2067 2067 2067 2067 2067 2067 2067 2067 2067 2067
Level 2 N 
(parties)
31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31 31
Note. AIC = Akaike information criterion; BIC = Bayesian information criterion.
***p < .001. **p < .01. *p < .05. †p < .10.
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that it is more likely that young challenger parties as well as 
extreme left- and right-wing parties communicate in a popu-
list manner.
Our study further demonstrates—on the basis of six coun-
tries—that parties are generally more inclined to use popu-
lism-related communication on social media than in political 
talk shows. By comparing the three different media channels, 
we corroborate that populism-related communication is indeed 
connected to Facebook and Twitter and that the advantages of 
social media to bypass gatekeepers and disseminate messages 
without interference are beneficial to populist communication 
in general. This is especially true for Facebook and confirms 
previous empirical evidence that Twitter is less suitable for 
populist communication compared to Facebook (Jacobs & 
Spierings, 2018). These results provide the first empirical evi-
dence for the theoretical assumption, that online opportunity 
structures and populist communication logic interact (Engesser 
et al., 2017). The channel comparison is significant in all 
investigated countries except for the United States. The differ-
ence between social media and talk shows in populism-related 
communication by Republicans and Democrats is not signifi-
cant, and politicians of the Democratic Party such as Bernie 
Sanders or Claire McCaskill tend to use more populism on 
television. However, Republicans in general and especially 
politicians such as John Boehner and Newt Gingrich are fully 
in line with our results and spread their populism-related com-
munication mainly via social media. However, compared to 
European talk shows, American shows tend to offer more lib-
erty and less journalistic interference, presenting opportunities 
for political actors to employ populist communication. Overall, 
these factors thus point to a communication culture in U.S. 
talk shows that is as beneficial for populist communication as 
social media.
At the party level, we find evidence that new challenger 
parties, and to a somewhat lesser extent also parties at the mar-
gins of the political spectrum, use more populism-related com-
munication. It is not only right-wing parties such as Swiss 
SVP, German AfD, Italian Lega Nord, or UKIP, but also left-
wing parties such as the German Linke or British Green party 
that make ample use of populist communication elements 
(Tables 3 and 5). For challenger parties, we find a predisposi-
tion toward populism in all types of statements (Models 4, 8, 
and 12 of Table 5), for extreme parties most strongly in state-
ments that combine key messages with style elements (Model 
4 of Table 5). We thus confirm earlier studies on the commu-
nication repertoire of extreme parties (see also Bernhard, 
2016; Ernst et al., 2017; Rooduijn & Akkerman, 2017), but 
would like to call for future studies to pay more attention to the 
separate use of key messages and style elements (because we 
found weaker effects there). We find the strongest use of pop-
ulism-related communication, incidentally, for those parties to 
which both the characterization “extreme party” and the char-
acterization “new challenger party” apply at the same time 
(e.g., German Left, Lega Nord, UKIP). But there are also 
many counter examples. The Swiss SVP is a good example of 
a party that has a high extremism score, but has been estab-
lished in Switzerland for a long time and still relies strongly on 
populism-related communication. The British Liberal 
Democrats, German Greens, or the Italian Five Star Movement 
are excellent examples of challenger parties, but have only a 
moderate degree of extremism, and yet use high levels of pop-
ulism in their communication.6 Overall, these examples dem-
onstrate that while commonly labeled populist parties are 
challenger and extreme parties at the same time, political par-
ties holding only one of the properties also employ a high 
degree of populism on social media and talk shows. This con-
firms our argument that extreme position and challenger status 
are two independent properties that are separate explanatory 
factors for populist communication.
Some limitations must be considered. First, due to the 
sampling procedure, the study only includes politicians who 
appeared in political talk shows. Even though most of these 
politicians have active Twitter and/or Facebook accounts, the 
sample does not include politicians who are not regular talk 
show guests and therefore rely heavily on their social media 
communication. This sample strategy excludes social media 
affine politicians that willingly circumvent either tradition 
elite media (e.g., Trump) or political outsiders that are not 
able to find a stage in mainstream media. A sample including 
such politicians might find even stronger support for the 
argument that social media “beats” political talk shows. 
Another limitation is the rather low sample size in terms of 
countries and parties; the findings represent a specific sam-
ple and any generalizations must be drawn carefully. Since 
the party sample includes many more moderate center parties 
than extreme ones, it would be desirable to further investi-
gate far left- and right-wing parties. The sample for France is 
especially problematic because it is only represented by the 
French Socialist Party. In the eight episodes of Le Grand Jury 
and Le Grand Journal, politicians from other parties were not 
invited.7 Including further key French parties such as “Front 
National,” “Left Front,” “The Republicans,” or “La 
République En Marche!” could improve the findings for the 
French context. A final limitation concerns the lack of any 
national elections during the routine time period. Populist 
communication could be different during elections. In par-
ticular, the debates and discussions on political talk shows 
might be enriched and loaded with more populist communi-
cation elements. Future studies should strive to sample both 
routine periods and election campaigns and include a broader 
sample of countries and parties to compare populist commu-
nication across these different modes of operation.
In conclusion, the study at hand contributes to populist 
communication scholarship in several ways. It integrates the 
two diverging perspectives on populist ideology and populist 
style and identifies three populist style dimensions that are of 
heuristic value for further research on populist styles. It fur-
ther establishes that social media is more useful for 
disseminating populism-related communication than talk 
shows—contesting previous studies that identified the 
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importance of talk shows. Finally, the study finds support 
across countries and media platforms that parties still fight-
ing for their place and parties positioning themselves at the 
polar ends of the political spectrum show the highest tenden-
cies to use populist communication. Future research should 
follow a communication-centered approach and investigate 
the broad political spectrum. Furthermore, it is crucial to dif-
ferentiate between various media channels. A next logical 
step would thus be to investigate and compare the populist 
communication by parties on social media and political talk 
shows with their representation in the traditional news media 
(print and TV) or online news.
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Notes
1. We are not including the exclusion of out-groups as a defining 
feature of populist communication as this is rather linked only 
to radical right-wing populism (Rooduijn, 2014).
2. Italian Servizio Pubblico and Ballarò are an exception with an 
airtime of approximately 170 min.
3. From the 110 identified politicians, only 15 had no verified 
Twitter or Facebook account. In the final analysis, only four 
politicians had no verified account.
4. We extended the study period to the whole year for politicians 
who had less than 100 Tweets or Facebook posts.
5. We run the models as an additional robustness check including 
the six countries as another random effect on the third level in the 
models and could replicate the same effects for all 12 models.
6. The party using the most populism in their communication—
the Welsh Plaid Cymru Party—is an exceptional case. With a 
CHES score of 3.25, it has a rather moderate extremism score. 
As it was founded in 1925 and has been part of the U.K. parlia-
ment since 1966, Plaid Cymru cannot be considered an extreme 
or challenger party. However, the results must be interpreted 
with caution because this party is only represented by its party 
leader, Leanne Wood, in our sample. Her tendency to use popu-
lism-related communication in almost 80% of all her statements 
may be related to her role advocating the Welsh independence 
and her critical stance against the U.K. government.
7. One exception is the independent Robert Ménard, who we had 
to exclude from the analysis because of his nonexistent party 
affiliation.
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